Strategic Risk from Autonomous Nuclear Platforms: Assessing Poseidon's First-Strike Potential

Research examining the strategic implications of Russia's Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle and its potential use as a pre-deployed first-strike system.

Working PaperNovember 21, 2025

Nuclear Strategy • Nuclear Security • Strategic Studies • National Security

Abstract

The emergence of the Russian Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle marks a critical evolution in nuclear weapons delivery. This research examines its potential use as a pre-deployed first-strike system and the resulting implications for warning time, attribution, strategic stability, deterrence, and arms control. Using open-source intelligence, strategic modeling, government and policy literature, and historical analogues, the study evaluates vulnerabilities in Western deterrence frameworks and proposes policy responses involving undersea domain awareness, nuclear posture, and arms-control mechanisms for autonomous nuclear systems.

Research Information

Author

Christopher Clark

Public-Release Status

Cleared for public release

Cleared for open publication by the Department of Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review on November 21, 2025, case 25-P-1107. Review does not imply Department of Defense endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion.

Full Text

Full text available

Download cleared manuscript (PDF)

Citation

APA

Clark, C. (2025). Strategic risk from autonomous nuclear platforms: Assessing Poseidon's first-strike potential [Working paper].

Chicago

Clark, Christopher. "Strategic Risk from Autonomous Nuclear Platforms: Assessing Poseidon's First-Strike Potential." Working paper, 2025.

BibTeX

@unpublished{clark2025poseidon,
  author = {Christopher Clark},
  title = {Strategic Risk from Autonomous Nuclear Platforms: Assessing Poseidon's First-Strike Potential},
  year = {2025},
  month = {11},
  note = {Working paper. Cleared for open publication by the Department of Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review, case 25-P-1107, November 21, 2025}
}

Research overview

This research examines the Russian Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle through a first-strike and strategic-stability lens.

The analysis evaluates how a persistent autonomous undersea nuclear platform could complicate assumptions concerning warning time, attribution, survivable retaliatory forces, command and control, and existing arms-control frameworks.

The study uses open-source intelligence, strategic modeling, government and policy literature, and historical analogues to examine the potential consequences of pre-positioned autonomous nuclear systems.

Key research areas

The manuscript addresses:

autonomous and loitering nuclear delivery systems;
undersea domain awareness;
strategic warning and attribution;
first-strike and second-strike stability;
U.S. and NATO maritime infrastructure vulnerability;
nuclear command-and-control ambiguity;
arms-control limitations;
strategic communications and misperception;
cyber and kinetic attack coordination;
institutional and workforce readiness.

Public-release status

This manuscript was cleared for open publication by the Department of Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review on November 21, 2025, under case 25-P-1107.

The clearance permits public release of this specific reviewed manuscript. It does not constitute Department of Defense endorsement of the manuscript’s factual accuracy, analysis, conclusions, or opinions.

A later 2026 editorial revision titled Poseidon and the Risk of Nuclear First Use contains substantive revisions and is maintained separately. It is not represented here as covered by this clearance.

Supporting material

The cleared manuscript includes:

an ISR and strategic-target mapping figure;
analysis of potential Poseidon loiter zones;
a comparison of treaty coverage for autonomous nuclear systems;
modeled fleet-asset replacement costs;
modeled naval-port reconstruction timelines;
appendices covering strategic simulation assumptions and arms-control limitations.

Full text

The exact manuscript reviewed under case 25-P-1107 is available as a PDF.

No journal publication, DOI, volume, issue, or editorial acceptance is claimed for this version.