Originally published July 9, 2025. Republished here as part of the author’s canonical professional archive.

Through my coursework in Cybersecurity and National Security at Excelsior University, I conducted an in-depth analysis of the 2015 and 2016 cyberattacks on Ukraine’s energy grid — attributed to Russian threat actors. These attacks demonstrated how layered cyber operations can severely disrupt national power infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Defense later emphasized that similar attacks could be devastating in the United States, given our highly interdependent infrastructure and limited segmentation between IT and OT networks (U.S. Department of Defense, 2017).

Recent intelligence reinforces this reality. In early 2025, French intelligence attributed ongoing cyber campaigns and disruptive operations to Russia’s GRU (APT28/Fancy Bear), emphasizing risks to national emergency broadcast systems and civil infrastructure during crisis scenarios (Reuters, 2025).

Similarly, in a public address in late 2024, FBI Director Christopher Wray warned that China is strategically “pre-positioning malware” within critical U.S. infrastructure. This malware is not designed for immediate disruption but rather as a latent tool for strategic leverage in future conflicts (Wray, 2025). These actions reflect a long-term investment in cyber preconditioning — foreshadowing a broader, multi-domain confrontation.

From an adversarial perspective, layered, multi-domain, and parallel attacks are the most effective method of challenging a technologically advanced power like the U.S. These “cyber shock and awe” tactics align with the doctrine of Unrestricted Warfare by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (1999), which advocates for exploiting all available domains:

  • Cyber
  • Economic
  • Political
  • Psychological
  • Informational

The goal is to asymmetrically destabilize and overwhelm superior opponents. Asymmetric warfare has become the norm in modern conflict — and it is accelerating in both tempo and impact.

Michael Pillsbury’s The Hundred-Year Marathon (2015) supports this perspective, outlining China’s long-term strategy to surpass the U.S. not through open confrontation but through decades of institutional infiltration, economic alignment, and technological dominance.

China’s national cybersecurity strategy is anchored in vertical integration, domestic production, strict cyber regulation (e.g., the Great Firewall), and strategic trade decoupling. Their approach reflects a whole-of-nation resilience model. The historical lesson of the Century of Humiliation has instilled a level of strategic patience that contrasts sharply with the West’s shorter policy cycles. This is a flaw that is actively and predictable exploited. We cannot agree on simple issues for even four years or more, while China is more than halfway through a 100-year plan and has not been stopped or checked in any domain.

This mindset was made explicit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the 2023 Munich Security Conference, stating:

“China is a country with more than 5,000 years of history. We have seen many empires come and go. We are not worried about the United States.” (Wintour, 2023)

Such declarations are not rhetorical, but historically verified statements of fact, they are expressions of long-term civilizational confidence and strategic continuity. (This is not “fake news”)

Drawing from my experience in Nuclear Engineering and ICS/OT cybersecurity, it’s clear that defending against these threats requires dismantling silos across multiple engineering disciplines, domestic and foreign policy, and our national defense sectors. We must build a cohesive strategy that merges multi-discipline engineering expertise, cross-sector cybersecurity defense, and adaptive strategic foresight to safeguard national infrastructure, economic sovereignty, and our national security interests.

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